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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with the 
underlying philosophy that full disclosure would lead to honest secu-
rities markets.
1
  Lacking the expertise to curb the speculation and 
dishonest business practices that had become all but ubiquitous by 
the stock market crash of 1929 through statute alone, Congress creat-
ed the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and gave it broad au-
thority over the securities markets.
2
  The arterial source of the this au-
thority is the general anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act, which grants the SEC the authority to prescribe rules 
to combat deceptive practices in connection with the sale or purchase 
of a security.
3
  In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 as a means 
 
 * J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law.  B.S., 2006, Loyola Uni-
versity Maryland. 
 1 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“There cannot be honest markets without 
honest publicity.  Manipulation and dishonest practices of the market place thrive 
upon mystery and secrecy.”).  The legislation fundamentally aimed to “substitute a 
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve 
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”  SEC v. Capital Gains 
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).   
 2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (2006); see also Steve 
Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 385, 461 (1990) (arguing that Congress intended to give the SEC much more 
authority than the Supreme Court later interpreted the Exchange Act to convey). 
 3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).  Section 
10(b) states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange— 
. . . . 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not 
so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in 
section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or de-
ceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regu-
lations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
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to carry out Congress’s charge.
4
  The rule prohibits a person from 
employing a plan to defraud, making any material misrepresentations 
or omissions, or from engaging in any fraudulent act in connection 
with a purchase or sale of a security.
5
  Although Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 do not explicitly authorize private suits, federal courts first 
recognized such a right in 1946,
6
 and the Supreme Court later 
acknowledged the same.
7
  Since that time, private suits have dominat-
ed federal court securities litigation.
8
 
Private 10b-5 litigation evolved despite Congress’s and the SEC’s 
reticence.
9
  Struggling to define the rule’s scope and limitations, 
courts borrowed from the common-law tort actions of deceit and mis-
representation.
10
 Six elements have emerged that a plaintiff generally 
must articulate to state a valid Rule 10b-5 claim: (1) a material mis-
representation (or omission) (2) made knowingly (i.e., defendant 
acted with scienter) (3) in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security where (4) the plaintiff’s reliance on the misrepresentation or 
 
Id. 
 4 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 5 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Id. 
 6 See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 7 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230–31 (1988) (“Judicial interpretation 
and application, legislative acquiescence, and the passage of time have removed any 
doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . 
. .”). 
 8 See Thel, supra note 2, at 462. 
 9 See Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and Unwarranted Exten-
sion of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 360 n.5 (1995) 
(“[P]rivate actions under Rule 10b-5 . . . [are] a judicial oak which [have] grown 
from little more than a legislative acorn.” (alterations in original) (quoting Blue 
Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 10 See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme 
Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 652 n.183 (2008) (“[J]udicially implied private securities 
fraud actions resemble in many (but not all) respects common-law deceit and mis-
representation action.” (quoting Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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omission (5) was the proximate cause of (6) the plaintiff’s economic 
loss.
11
 
One of the most debated elements is that of reliance (which is 
often combined with causation and collapsed into a single inquiry).
12
  
Traditionally, a plaintiff would satisfy this element by showing that 
some form of disclosure or nondisclosure amounts to a material mis-
representation, and that the misrepresentation influenced the indi-
vidual plaintiff’s investment decision.
13
  Noting the difficulty in prov-
ing direct reliance in modern securities markets, however, courts 
eventually came to presume reliance in certain circumstances.
14
 
One of these presumptions is based on a theory known as the 
“fraud created the market.”  First articulated by the Fifth Circuit in 
Shores v. Sklar, the theory presupposes that were it not for the issuer’s 
intentional fraud, the security would not have been marketable.
15
  
That is, investors are able to rely on a security’s availability in the 
market as evidence that the security is marketable.  If the standard is 
met, investors can evade the traditional requirement of proving di-
rect reliance on the issuer’s fraud in making the investment deci-
sion.
16
 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision is a controversial one.  Some courts 
have accepted the fraud-created-the-market theory (at least in some 
variation); others have rejected it entirely.
17
  The theory was most re-
cently addressed in Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, a case arising from a 
bond issuance that led to substantial investor losses.
18
  After the issuer 
went bankrupt and the notes were rendered worthless, the plaintiff 
sued and sought class certification.
19
  The plaintiff did not allege that 
the investors relied on the defendant’s allegedly fraudulent conduct 
 
 11 See, e.g., Broudo, 544 U.S. at 341–42.  While the scope of this Comment is re-
stricted to the reliance requirement, all of the 10b-5 elements have been contested 
and the Supreme Court has addressed many of them.  See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224 (1988) (materiality); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 245 U.S. 185 (1976) 
(scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security); Dura Pharms, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336 (2005) (causation). 
 12 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 160 
(2008). 
 13 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 361. 
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
 15 647 F.2d 462, 469–70 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 16 Id. at 469. 
 17 See infra Part II.C–D. 
 18 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 19 Id. at 744. 
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when purchasing the notes.
20
  Instead, he argued for a presumption 
of reliance under the fraud-created-the-market theory. 
21
  Specifically, 
the plaintiff alleged that were it not for the defendant’s fraud, the 
notes would not have been marketable and therefore would not and 
could not have been purchased.
22
  The Third Circuit disagreed.
23
  In 
what is perhaps the most vigorous rejection of the theory to date, the 
court rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory in its entirety.
24
  
The Malack decision widened the current circuit split and thus invites 
a reexamination of the reliance requirement and the validity of the 
presumptions that have attached to it.
25
 
Part II of this Comment discusses the background and develop-
ment of Rule 10b-5 private actions, presumptions of reliance, and the 
fraud-created-the-market theory.  Part III discusses and analyzes the 
Malack decision and the rationale behind the Third Circuit’s rejec-
tion of the theory.  Finally, Part IV argues that the Supreme Court 
should resolve the circuit split by endorsing a narrow form of the 
fraud-created-the-market theory.  By doing so, the Court could re-
solve the split by eliminating some of the theory’s problems while 
maintaining an effective avenue for investor relief.  The Supreme 
Court should prefer such a conciliatory course of action as opposed 
to rejecting the theory altogether. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Reliance Requirement 
To state a valid 10b-5 claim, the plaintiff must have relied on a 
material misstatement or omission in making the investment deci-
sion.
26
  Reliance is essential because it “provides the requisite causal 
connection between a defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s 
injury.”
27
  The requirement further ensures that the Exchange Act’s 
philosophy of full disclosure is carried out and that diligent investors 
use those disclosures to make informed decisions.
28
 
 
 20 Id. at 745. 
 21 Id. at 749. 
 22 Id. at 745. 
 23 Id. at 749. 
 24 Malack, 617 F.3d at 756. 
 25 See infra Part II.C–D. 
 26 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988). 
 27 Id. 
 28 AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the 
reliance requirement ensures that “the plaintiff exercised the diligence that a rea-
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Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 contains a reliance re-
quirement.  Federal courts have instead embraced common-law fraud 
elements in imposing a reliance requirement on a 10b-5 action.
29
  Sat-
isfying the requirement in early 10b-5 cases was particularly burden-
some.  Generally, a plaintiff had to show that he had read and relied 
upon the disclosure materials of the security, such as a prospectus or 
annual statement, and that the materials contained a material mis-
representation or omission.
30
  This intentionally onerous standard 
acted as a bulwark against excessive litigation.  Indeed, courts and 
commentators have noted the importance of maintaining the direct 
reliance requirement in order to prevent private 10b-5 litigation from 
becoming a form of “investor’s insurance” that reimburses investors 
who have merely made a bad decision.
31
Perhaps adapting to an evolv-
ing financial landscape, courts have nonetheless deemed the direct 
reliance requirement an unreasonable evidentiary burden, and, in 
certain situations, will forego the traditional standard and presume 
reliance instead.
32
 
B. Established Presumptions of Reliance 
The Supreme Court has expressly adopted two presumptions of 
reliance—the first in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
33
 the second 
in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.
34
 
1. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States marks the Supreme Court’s 
first departure from the requirement of direct reliance.  Two bank 
employees, whose employer acted as transfer agent for the security at 
issue, induced the plaintiffs to sell their stock.
35
  As a result, the plain-
tiffs captured a price lower than market value, and subsequently al-
 
sonable person under all of the circumstances would have exercised to protect his 
own interests” (citing Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 597–98 (3d Cir. 1976)). 
 29 Basic, 485 U.S. at 243; see also Prentice, supra note 10, at 562; John A. 
MacKerron, The Price Integrity Cause of Action Under Rule 10b-5: Limited and Expanding 
the Use of the Fraud on the Market Theory, 69 OR. L. REV. 177, 184 (1990). 
 30 See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994) 
(“Allowing plaintiffs to circumvent the reliance requirement would disregard the 
careful limits on Rule 10b-5 recovery mandated by our earlier cases.”); Peil v. Speiser, 
806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986) (discussing theories of reliance). 
 31 Basic, 485 U.S. at 251–52 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
see also Herzog, supra note 9, at 362–63. 
 32 See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 33 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 34 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 35 Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153. 
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leged that the employees withheld, for personal gain, information 
about the market for the security.
36
  The Court agreed and found the 
defendants liable for failing to disclose material information appur-
tenant to the sale.
37
  Noting that Rule 10b-5 requires some flexibility, 
the Court implicitly recognized the difficulty that a plaintiff faces in 
trying to prove that he relied on an omission or a failure to disclose.
38
  
As a result, courts will now presume reliance in face-to-face transac-
tions when the nondisclosure or omission encouraged the purchase 
or sale of a security.
39
 
Courts that have analyzed the Affiliated Ute presumption have 
held that the presumption is rebuttable notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s silence on the issue.
40
  A defendant is thus given the oppor-
tunity to show that the nondisclosure did not affect the plaintiff’s in-
vestment decision by proving, for example, that the plaintiff never 
read the offering materials and therefore would not have been influ-
enced by the information had it been proffered.
41
 
2. Basic Inc. v. Levinson and the Fraud-on-the-Market 
Theory 
The second Supreme Court-endorsed presumption of reliance is 
based on what is known as the fraud-on-the-market theory.  The 
Ninth Circuit, in Blackie v. Barrack, was the first court to articulate this 
theory.
42
  The Supreme Court later adopted it in Basic Inc. v. Levin-
son.
43
  Unlike Affiliated Ute, which involved fraudulent nondisclosures, 
the fraud-on-the-market theory applies to affirmative misrepresenta-
tions.
44
 
 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 153 (“The defendants may not stand mute while they facilitate the mixed-
bloods’ sales . . . .  The sellers had the right to know that the defendants were in a 
position to gain financially from their sales and that their shares were selling for a 
higher price in the market.”). 
 38 See Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988). 
 39 Herzog, supra note 9, at 365. 
 40 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 
(2008); Black v. Finantra Capital, Inc., 418 F.3d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 2005); DuPont v. 
Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 
410 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 41 Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 42 524 F.2d 891, 905–09 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 43 485 U.S. 224, 241–49 (1988). 
 44 Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907–08. 
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The presumption is based on the notion that an investor relies 
on the integrity of the market when making an investment decision.
45
  
To avail herself of the presumption, a plaintiff must satisfy three re-
quirements: (1) the information in question must have been materi-
al, (2) the market must have been efficient (i.e., open and devel-
oped), and (3) the misinformation must have been disseminated 
publicly.
46
  Using common stock as an example, the theory assumes 
that in an efficient market, a company’s share price represents the 
monetary value of all of the information that is available and accessi-
ble to investors.
47
  Good news might cause the shares to increase in 
value; bad news might send the stock tumbling.  Misrepresentations 
or false statements that reach the open market will similarly affect 
share price.  Thus, the misrepresentation could injure a buyer or sell-
er of the stock, irrespective of whether that misrepresentation actual-
ly factored into the investment decision.
48
 
In Basic, a corporation made three public statements denying 
the possibility of a merger, only to complete the merger a few months 
later.
49
  Former shareholders brought a class action suit under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that the false denials resulted in an ar-
tificially-low stock price at the time of sale.
50
  In other words, had the 
company acknowledged that a merger was imminent, the sharehold-
ers would have captured a higher price. 
 
 45 Basic, 485 U.S. at 245. 
 46 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.10 
(6th ed. 2009); see also JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 704–06 (6th ed. 
2009).  See generally Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with 
Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984); 
Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A Label in Search of A Theory, 52 
ALB. L. REV. 923 (1988). 
 47 Basic, 485 U.S. at 241.  The Court noted that the economic underpinning of 
the theory, known as the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, garners support from 
empirical studies and economic analysis.  Id. at 246, 247 n.24.  Generally, the hy-
pothesis maintains that investors’ and market professionals’ evaluation of all public 
information regarding a stock will form the stock’s price.  HAZEN, supra note 46, § 
12.10.  For a more detailed analysis of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, see 
MacKerron, supra note 29. 
 48 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242.  To invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege that: 
The defendants made public misrepresentations; 
The misrepresentations were material in that they would induce a rea-
sonable relying investor to misjudge the value of the share; 
The shares were traded in an efficient market; and 
The plaintiff traded the shares between the time the misrepresenta-
tions were made and the time the truth was revealed. 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248, n.27. 
 49 Id. at 227–28. 
 50 Id. at 228. 
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Under the traditional reliance requirement, each member of the 
Basic plaintiff class would have had to prove that she relied on the 
corporation’s denials when making the decision to sell in order to 
certify the class.
51
  For a stock with many shareholders, this would 
prove quite difficult.  Accordingly, the Court found that a presump-
tion of reliance existed under the fraud-on-the-market theory and the 
class action could proceed despite the absence of individualized reli-
ance.
52
 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion emphasized the difficulty that a 
plaintiff class would face without the presumption.
53
  Because class 
certification under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires 
common questions to predominate over individual questions,
54
 each 
class member would have to prove individual reliance on the misrep-
resentations, and all reliance arguments would have to share some 
form of commonality.
55
  Such a requirement would create an unrea-
sonable evidentiary burden, especially in light of the modern and 
largely anonymous securities markets that handle millions of trades 
daily.
56
  This would not only preclude investor recovery but might also 
act as an impetus for a company to engage in fraudulent activity. 
Although Basic represents a substantial gain for investors, the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption is rebuttable.
57
  The Court articu-
lated a number of ways in which a defendant would go about “sev-
er[ing] the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either 
the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at 
a fair market price,” including showing that the market price would 
not have been affected by the misrepresentations, that the truthful 
merger discussions were disseminated into the market, or that the in-
vestor knew that the merger denial was false but sold the stock any-
way.
58
 
The fraud-on-the-market theory and the Affiliated Ute presump-
tion are particularly helpful to plaintiffs seeking relief under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  In Affiliated Ute, the Court recognized the dif-
ficulty plaintiffs would face in trying to prove they relied on an omis-
 
 51 Id. at 242. 
 52 Id. at 250. 
 53 Id. at 243. 
 54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3). 
 55 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242. 
 56 Id. at 243. 
 57 Id. at 248. 
 58 Id. at 248–49. 
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sion.
59
  In Basic, the Court similarly recognized the evidentiary burden 
that traditional reliance requirements would impose on a plaintiff 
class.
60
  As a result, a plaintiff can generally forego the traditional reli-
ance requirement if she can show that the circumstances surrounding 
the investment decision fit into one of the two presumptions.
61
 
C. The Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory 
The protections that the Affiliated Ute and Basic presumptions 
cast over investors do not extend to securities being issued (i.e., the 
primary market) or to inefficient (e.g., thinly-traded) markets.
62
  Im-
agine, for example, that an investor bought bonds from a corporation 
wishing to raise capital.  The disclosure literature that was distributed 
with the bond offering contained fraudulent information, and the 
bond subsequently lost its value.  The two reliance presumptions pro-
vide the investor no relief: the Affiliated Ute presumption is inapplica-
ble outside of a failure to disclose and the fraud-on-the-market theory 
requires an efficient market.  An efficient market is one in which 
regular trading occurs
63
—an element lacking in the primary market.  
To bring a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim, then, the investor 
would need to prove that he directly relied on the misrepresentation 
in the disclosure materials.  This would make class certification a near 
impossibility. 
Some courts have responded to this dilemma by employing a 
third presumption of reliance in a primary-market context.
64
  The 
Fifth Circuit was the first court to expressly endorse this presump-
tion.
65
  In Shores, a mobile-home manufacturer and proposed under-
writer persuaded a town board to issue revenue bonds.
66
  The bonds 
funded the construction of an industrial facility, which the manufac-
turer leased in order to conduct operations, and the manufacturer’s 
rent payments were to be used to pay the interest on the bonds.
67
  
The plaintiff had purchased three municipal bonds from the offe-
 
 59 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 60 See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.  
 61 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 373. 
 62 See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 901 n.170 (1992). 
 63 See HAZEN, supra note 46, § 12.10. 
 64 See infra Part II.C.1–3. 
 65 See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 66 Id. at 465. 
 67 Id. 
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ror.
68
  Less than a year and a half after the initial offering, the manu-
facturer defaulted on its rental payments and the value of the bonds 
dropped precipitously.
69
  Investors recovered approximately thirty-
seven percent of their original investment.
70
  The plaintiff alleged that 
the offering circular, drafted by the bond counsel Sklar, contained 
material misrepresentations and omissions.
71
 
Although a plaintiff in this situation could typically invoke the 
Affiliated Ute presumption to encompass the material information that 
was omitted from the offering circular, here, the plaintiff admitted 
that he was not aware of the offering circular.
72
  Thus, the plaintiff 
foreclosed use of the Affiliated Ute presumption—essentially perform-
ing the defendant’s job of rebutting the presumption—by admitting 
that he had not relied on the fraudulent documents.  For this reason, 
the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
73
  
The Fifth Circuit vacated, however, paving the way for a new pre-
sumption of reliance.
74
 
The Court of Appeals held that the issuers’ fraud was an “elabo-
rate scheme” that went beyond the misrepresentations and omissions 
contained in the offering circular.
75
  Accordingly, the plaintiff’s alle-
gations were sufficient under parts (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, which 
use broad terms to define the actionable activity.
76
  The scheme was 
deemed to be so pervasive that, without it, the bonds would not have 
been offered on the market at any price.
77
  Thus, just as in the case of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory,
78
 the plaintiff was relying on the in-
 
 68 Id. at 467. 
 69 Id. at 463–64, 464 n.1. 
 70 See id. at 464 n.1. 
 71 Shores, 647 F.2d at 465–66.  Indeed, the court found some of these misrepre-
sentations and nondisclosures to be quite egregious.  For example, the circular failed 
to mention that an SEC investigation and civil action was proceeding against the 
proposed underwriter and misrepresented the financial soundness of the manufac-
turer and its shareholder.   Id. 
 72 Id. at 468. 
 73 Id. at 464. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 468. 
 76 Section (a) of the Rule prohibits the employment of a “scheme” to defraud; 
section (c) prohibits any “act” that operates as a fraud; section (b) requires reliance 
on a specific statement or omission and thus was eliminated as an avenue for relief 
when the plaintiff admitted to not having read the offering material.  17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2012). 
 77 Shores, 647 F.2d at 463–64 n.2. 
 78 The similarities and differences between the two theories have generated sig-
nificant debate between the circuits.  See infra Part IV. 
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tegrity of the market in making the investment decision and not a 
specific statement or omission by the defendant.
79
  That is, the securi-
ty’s availability in the marketplace allowed the plaintiff to presume its 
genuineness.  The major difference, however, is that the fraud-
created-the-market theory applies to primary markets, whereas the 
fraud-on-the-market theory is restricted to efficient secondary mar-
kets.
80
 
The court articulated three requirements that a plaintiff must 
show in order to be entitled to the presumption: (1) the defendants 
knowingly conspired to bring securities that were not entitled to be 
marketed onto the market intending to defraud the purchaser, (2) 
the plaintiff reasonably relied on the security’s availability in the mar-
ket as an indication of the security’s apparent genuineness, and (3) as 
a result of the scheme to defraud, the plaintiff suffered a loss.
81
 
The fraud-created-the-market theory, as envisioned by the Shores 
court, arguably sets a higher threshold than the fraud-on-the-market 
theory—merely affecting share price will not do; the fraud has to be 
so significant as to make the security totally unmarketable.
82
  But just 
what does “not entitled to be marketed” mean?  Shores failed to elabo-
rate.
83
  Hence, courts analyzing the fraud-created-the-market theory 
have necessarily focused on the first requirement of the Shores test.  
Courts have interpreted this concept differently, and three main vari-
ations have emerged.
84
 
1. Legal Unmarketability 
Legal unmarketability focuses on whether a regulatory agency or 
issuing municipality would have been required to prevent the security 
from being issued had it known about the misrepresentation or omis-
sion.
85
  T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb, Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel Au-
 
 79 Shores, 647 F.2d at 471. 
 80 Id. at 469–70; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 81 Shores, 647 F.2d at 469–70. 
 82 Id. at 470. 
 83 See Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 735 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., 
concurring) (“Marketability, as envisioned by the Shores court, is an elusive con-
cept.”). 
 84 There has been some confusion and overlap regarding the three types of un-
marketability in the Circuits.  For purposes of this comment, the author adopts the 
terms as the Third Circuit articulated them.  See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 
F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 85 Id. (quoting Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 
1994)). 
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thority is the seminal legal unmarketability case.
86
  There, the plaintiff, 
a broker-dealer distributing the defendants’ bonds, alleged that the 
defendants never intended to use the bond proceeds to construct a 
gas distribution facility, as they had claimed.
87
  The plaintiff further 
alleged that the bond counsel concealed this fact during the offering, 
and that the bonds were not issued pursuant to Oklahoma law.
88
 
The Tenth Circuit, adopting the reasoning set forth in Shores, 
held that even though federal or state regulators do not consider the 
truthfulness of representations made in an offering circular, an inves-
tor should be able to assume that the securities were lawfully issued.
89
  
Thus, because the plaintiff established that the defendant was prohib-
ited from issuing the bonds under Oklahoma law, the bonds were 
unmarketable and the court affirmed the class certification.
90
  Alt-
hough the court described the fraud-created-the-market theory as an 
extension of the fraud-on-the-market theory that the Supreme Court 
endorsed in Basic, the court significantly limited its holding to the 
narrow grounds that reliance can be presumed only for securities that 
were issued in contravention of some state or federal law.
91
  The 
Tenth Circuit therefore equated “not entitled to be marketed” with 
illegality.  This holding refines the Shores standard and distinguishes 
the Tenth Circuit from other courts that would later apply their own 
variation of the fraud-created-the-market presumption.
92
 
2. Economic Unmarketability 
Economic unmarketability directs the inquiry to whether the se-
curity is “patently worthless” such that no investor would buy the se-
curity.
93
  This is arguably the original standard that the Fifth Circuit 
 
 86 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983). 
 87 Id. at 1331. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1333. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 In Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000), the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed its legal unmarketability standard but also discussed economic unmarketabil-
ity.  The court did not rule on the validity of economic unmarketability because the 
plaintiff failed to meet the requirements, but the opinion implies that the court 
might allow it under different circumstances.  See id. 
 93 Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1994))(internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see also Ross v. South Bank, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir. 
1989) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority today focuses on what I term the eco-
nomic unmarketability of the bonds: could the bonds, because of the enormous risk 
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first put forth in Shores.
94
  There, the court noted that the fraud-
created-the-market theory cannot be satisfied merely by showing that 
the fraud caused the security to be issued at an aberrant price;
95
 the 
plaintiff must show instead that the security would never have been 
issued “at any price.”
96
  That is, the security must be patently worth-
less. 
The economic unmarketability standard has generated contro-
versy since its Shores beginnings.  Critics have doubted whether a se-
curity can ever be  so flawed that it could not be offered at any price.
97
  
Indeed, applying this worthlessness standard to Shores arguably casts 
doubt on the court’s holding because the plaintiffs recovered approx-
imately thirty-seven percent of their initial investment.
98
  Thus, the 
bonds were not patently worthless and could have been issued at 
some price—namely, thirty-seven percent of the original offering.  
Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit later followed Shores by applying 
the economic unmarketability standard in Ross v. South Bank, N.A.
99
 
Perhaps responding to the problems associated with valuing the 
worth of a security, the Fifth Circuit later refined the economic un-
marketability standard in Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co.
100
  There, the court 
opined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic allows the circuit 
courts to formulate their own tests to meet the reliance presump-
tion.
101
  Consequently, the court held that the presumption is only 
available “where the promoters knew that the subject enterprise was 
worthless when the securities were issued, and successfully issued the 
 
of nonpayment, have been brought onto the market at any combination of price and 
interest rate if the true risk of nonpayment had been known?”). 
 94 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 379. 
 95 Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 96 Id. at 464 n.2. 
 97 See Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) (“[N]o matter how great the 
risk of nonpayment, a bond can virtually always be sold at some combination of price 
and interest rate . . . .  [A] bond can never be completely worthless . . . .  [Economic 
unmarketability] creates a test that in both theory and practice cannot be met . . . .”); 
Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[S]aleable assets 
may bless even the most worthless enterprise.”). 
 98 Shores, 647 F.2d at 464 n.1. 
 99 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1989).  The Eleventh Circuit, an offspring of the for-
mer Fifth Circuit, adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed 
down prior to October 1, 1981.  Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 
(11th Cir. 1981). 
 100 Abell, 858 F.2d at 1122. 
 101 Id. at 1120. 
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securities only because of the defendants’ fraudulent scheme.”
102
  
This revision focuses on the intent of the promoter. 
3. Factual Unmarketability 
The third form of unmarketability is factual unmarketability.  
This approach focuses on whether a regulatory body or agency would 
have prevented the security from coming to market at its actual price 
and interest rate had it known of the information fraudulently with-
held.
103
  Judge Tjoflat, who had previously dissented in Shores, coined 
the term in his concurrence in Ross v. South Bank, N.A.
104
  He inter-
preted Shores as setting forth a factual unmarketability test that allows 
an investor to rely on a regulatory entity to establish the correct price 
and interest rate of a newly-issued security.
105
 
The factual unmarketability standard relies on the reasoning of 
Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, where the court stated 
that “the purchaser of an original issue security relies, at least indi-
rectly, on the integrity of the regulatory process and the truth of any 
representations made to appropriate agencies and the investors at the 
time of the original issue.”
106
  Thus, factual unmarketability does not 
run into the difficulties that economic unmarketability faces because 
it does not require the security to be worthless.
107
  Nor does it require 
the security to be issued unlawfully, as is required by legal unmarket-
ability.
108
 
Where the standard does face difficulty, however, is in its reli-
ance on a regulatory body.  Although factual unmarketability pre-
sumably allows an investor to rely on any regulatory entity to police 
 
 102 Id. at 1122–23 (emphasis added). 
 103 Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Ross, 
885 F.2d at 735–36 (Tjoflat, J., concurring)): 
[F]actual unmarketability looks to the actual securities issued, and asks 
“whether, in the absence of fraud, the securities would have been is-
sued given the actual price and interest rate at which they were issued.  
Under this approach, a security is unmarketable if, but for the fraudu-
lent scheme, some ‘regulatory’ entity (whether official or unofficial) 
would not have allowed the security to come onto the market at its ac-
tual price and interest rate.” 
Id. 
 104 Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
 105 Id. 
 106 549 F.2d 686, 695 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 107 “Even an extraordinarily risky security is entitled to be marketed; but a security 
that presumably would never have been issued by an entity but for the fraud is not 
‘entitled’ to be on the market.”  Ross, 885 F.2d at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
 108 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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the primary markets, it is the SEC that regulates new issues of securi-
ties by requiring issuers to register and disclose certain information.
109
  
Relying on the SEC to prevent a fraudulent security from coming to 
market is problematic for two reasons.  First, the securities laws pro-
vide several exemptions to SEC registration; the SEC does not review 
such exempted securities.
110
  More importantly, while the SEC re-
quires issuers to disclose certain information, the agency does not 
judge the merits of those disclosures.
111
  The fact that an investor 
cannot rely on the SEC to set the correct price for a newly-issued se-
curity thus seriously undermines the validity of factual unmarketabil-
ity.
112
 
D. Rejections of the Fraud-Created-the-Market Theory 
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have failed to recognize the 
fraud-created-the-market theory despite having the opportunity to do 
so.  The Seventh Circuit rejected the theory first in Eckstein v. Balcor 
Film Investors.
113
  The court, repudiating the holding in Shores instead 
of parsing through the different unmarketability variations,
114
 held 
that full disclosure does not keep a security from being marketed but 
may merely lower its price.
115
  The court held that “the linchpin of 
Shores—that disclosing bad information keeps securities off the mar-
ket, entitling investors to rely on the presence of the securities just as 
they would rely on statements in a prospectus—is simply false.”
116
 
The Seventh Circuit limited its holding to rejecting Shores and 
thus left open the possibility that it would recognize the fraud-
created-the-market theory under different facts.
117
  That is, had the 
issuer known that the securities were worthless or had the securities 
 
 109 See HAZEN, supra note 46, § 9.2. 
 110 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 381. 
 111 See id.; infra Part IV. 
 112 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 381. 
 113 8 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1993).  The case involved partnership interests, regis-
tered and sold as securities, which declined in value after the issuer’s venture failed.  
Id. at 1123.  The interests were sold subject to a $35 million floor—the securities 
would not be issued if the issuer sold less than that amount.  Id. at 1130.  A group of 
plaintiffs who had not read the prospectus sued on the theory that, but for the mis-
representations and omissions, the investors who had read the prospectus would not 
have purchased the securities and the $35-million-floor requirement would not have 
been reached.  Id.  Thus, the securities would not have been issued.  Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1131. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. at 1130. 
O'LOUGHLIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  2:28 PM 
808 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:793 
been issued illegally—thus respectively satisfying the economic un-
marketability or legal unmarketability standards—the court’s decision 
may have been different. 
Following Eckstein, the Sixth Circuit failed to apply the fraud-
created-the-market theory in a class action arising from a bond issu-
ance.
118
  In Ockerman, the bonds were issued to finance the construc-
tion and operation of a nursing home.
119
  When the project went 
bankrupt, the bond purchasers suffered substantial losses, and the 
plaintiff sued on behalf of a class of investors.
120
  The plaintiff asked 
the court to presume reliance even though some of the investors had 
not read the defendant’s offering circular and there was no efficient 
market for the bonds.
121
 
The court refused to grant the presumption of reliance.
122
  Alt-
hough one of the problems with the fraud-created-the-market theory 
is defining “unmarketability,”
123
 the court noted that the plaintiff’s 
claim would have failed under either economic or legal unmarketa-
bility.
124
  First, the bonds were not worthless because the defendants 
sold the project after it declared bankruptcy (albeit for a fraction of 
the original issuance price).
125
  Second, there was nothing in the rec-
ord to indicate that the defendants used fraudulent means to issue 
the bonds illegally.
126
  Thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to presume 
reliance and instead had to prove that the investors directly relied on 
the offering circular.
127
  Notably, the court limited its holding to the 
facts of the case and withheld an absolute rejection of the theory.
128
 
 
 118 Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., 27 F.3d 1151, 1161 (6th Cir. 1994).  The Sixth 
Circuit had previously held that the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply to in-
efficient primary markets without expressly ruling on the validity of the fraud-
created-the-market theory.  See Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197, 
200 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 119 Ockerman, 27 F.3d at 1153. 
 120 Id. at 1154. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 1161. 
 123 Id. at 1160. 
 124 The court did not mention factual unmarketability. 
 125 Ockerman, 27 F.3d  at 1160. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
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III. THE MALACK DECISION 
A. Overview of the Decision 
An analysis of the decisions that have addressed the fraud-
created-the-market theory readily demonstrates the lack of uniformity 
across the circuits.
129
  Some courts have accepted the theory but have 
branched out beyond Shores; others have rejected parts of the theory; 
still others have refused to rule on its validity.
130
  The Third Circuit 
inherited this jurisprudential morass when Malack v. BDO Seidman, 
LLP reached its docket.
131
  The court, perhaps in response to the con-
fusion and controversy surrounding the theory, issued the most thor-
ough rejection of the fraud-created-the-market theory to date. 
The plaintiff, John Malack, and other investors purchased high-
yield notes issued by subprime mortgage originator American Busi-
ness Financial Services, Inc. (“American Business”) between October 
2002 and January 2005.
132
  The notes were non-transferrable and thus 
did not trade in an efficient market.
133
  The notes were also registered 
with the SEC, and the defendant BDO Seidman, LLP (“BDO”) pro-
vided American Business with audit opinions needed to complete the 
SEC filings.
134
 
American Business filed for bankruptcy in early 2005.
135
  Three 
years later, Malack sued under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and 
sought class certification.
136
  Malack alleged that the BDO audit opin-
ions were deficient and that, without clean opinions, American Busi-
ness would not have been able to register the notes with the SEC, the 
notes would not have been issued, Malack would have never bought 
the notes, and there would be no injury. 
137
  Malack requested that re-
liance be presumed based on legal unmarketability.
138
  The district 
court denied the request.
139
 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s denial of class certification, holding that Malack did not show 
 
 129 See supra Part II.C–D. 
 130 See supra Part II.C–D. 
 131 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 132 Id. at 744–45. 
 133 Id. at 745. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 745–46. 
 137 Malack, 617 F.3d at 745. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 746. 
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that the class was entitled to a presumption of reliance.
140
  The court 
first explained the two presumptions of reliance that the Supreme 
Court has already endorsed.
141
  Next, the court defined and explained 
the fraud-created-the-market theory and the three variations of un-
marketability that have emerged post-Shores.
142
  The court then dis-
cussed presumptions and the factors that a court should use when 
considering whether to grant a presumption; such factors include 
common sense, probability that proof of one fact allows for an infer-
ence of another fact, and congressional policies.
143
 
According to the court, common sense called for rejecting the 
fraud-created-the-market theory.
144
  The theory’s underlying assump-
tion—that a security’s availability on the market is an indication of its 
genuineness—is illogical because none of the entities involved in the 
security’s issuance guarantee against fraud.
145
  The corporate entities 
involved in issuing the security—the promoter, underwriter, auditor, 
and legal counsel—cannot be relied on to prevent fraud because they 
are seeking to profit from the issuance.
146
  Thus, these entities are self-
interested at best and dishonest at worst.
147
  Relying on entities that 
are seeking to profit from the issuance to prevent fraud would there-
fore be contrary to common sense. 
Similarly, the SEC—the entity with which the American Business 
notes were registered—cannot be relied on because the agency does 
not judge the merits of the disclosures associated with an issuance.
148
  
Instead, the SEC’s purpose is to ensure full disclosure without focus-
ing on the accuracy of those disclosures.
149
  Disclosure of negative in-
formation might lead to a reduction in offer price, but not to exclu-
sion from the market.
150
  The notes, therefore, would have been 
issued irrespective of whether BDO’s audit was accurate. 
Probability also supported disallowing the presumption.
151
  The 
fact that a security makes it to the market does not permit the infer-
 
 140 Id. at 756. 
 141 Id. at 747; see also supra Part II.B. 
 142 Malack, 617 F.3d at 747–48. 
 143 Id. at 749. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 749–50 
 147 Id. at 750. 
 148 Malack, 617 F.3d at 750. 
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 751.  
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ence that all securities that become marketable are free from fraud.  
Such an inferential leap would lead to an investor’s insurance that 
eliminates the need for a plaintiff to ever prove reliance.
152
  The court 
opined that “[a]ny investor who purchases any security could point to 
the security’s availability on the market to satisfy the reasonable reli-
ance element of a Section 10(b) claim.”
153
  Moreover, the fraud-
created-the-market theory is not supported by empirical studies and 
economic theory.  The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, underly-
ing the fraud-on-the-market theory, does not apply to issuances be-
cause primary markets are inefficient.
154
  Probability therefore does 
not lend itself to presuming that the bonds are free from fraud mere-
ly because they made it to the market. 
The Third Circuit also highlighted that the fraud-created-the-
market theory may disserve important policy goals.
155
  For one, recent 
legislation points towards Congress’s desire to narrow the scope of 
Section 10(b) liability.
156
  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995, for example, mandates stricter requirements for private se-
curities actions.
157
  Moreover, creating a form of investor’s insurance 
that could be invoked at any time that a security has made it to mar-
ket is contrary to public policy.
158
  Instead of informing investors via 
disclosures, such a presumption incentivizes investors to ignore dis-
closures altogether because presence in the market alone is enough 
to satisfy the reliance requirement.
159
  In this sense, the theory also 
promotes frivolous lawsuits by relieving the plaintiff of an important 
evidentiary burden.  In turn, plaintiff class certification becomes easi-
er and issuers are pressured to settle claims.
160
  This harms all market 
participants as the overall cost of issuing securities increases.
161
  Thus, 
the court held that extending Section 10(b) liability is for Congress 
 
 152 Id. at 752. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See supra note 47. 
 155 Malack, 617 F.3d at 752–55. 
 156 Id. at 754 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlantica, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 157 (2008)). 
 157 S. REP. NO. 104-98 (1995).  The PSLRA attempts to establish a stricter loss cau-
sation requirement for securities fraud claims and seeks to limit meritless securities 
fraud claims.  Id. at 4, 23. 
 158 Malack, 617 F.3d at 752. 
 159 Id. at 753. 
 160 Id. at 755. 
 161 Id. 
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not the judiciary and refused to adopt the fraud-created-the-market 
theory.
162
 
Despite this outright rejection, the court proceeded to analyze 
Malack’s claim that the American Business notes were legally unmar-
ketable.
163
  The claim easily failed this standard because nothing in 
the record supported the assertion that American Business or its 
notes were illegal, irrespective of whether BDO’s audit was defi-
cient.
164
  In other words, there was nothing to stop the securities from 
coming to the market.  As such, the court refused to presume reli-
ance and it ultimately denied class certification.
165
 
B. Discussion 
The Malack court gave a thoughtful and thorough explanation 
as to why it rejected the fraud-created-the-market theory.  Unlike pri-
or circuits that have addressed the issue, the Third Circuit made clear 
that it was rejecting the theory as a whole, rather than declining to 
apply it to certain factual scenarios.
166
  This will likely bring welcomed 
clarity to lower courts and securities lawyers alike.  Despite the abso-
lute rejection, however, Malack’s claim was weak, and the court would 
have denied class certification under any of the unmarketability varia-
tions articulated in previous cases. 
The legal unmarketability standard—perhaps the clearest of the 
three variations—requires a security to be issued illegally.
167
  Here, 
there was no indication or allegation that the American Business 
notes were issued contrary to any state or federal law.  Similarly, had 
the court endorsed economic unmarketability as set forth in Abell, 
Malack would have had to show that the notes were patently worthless 
and that BDO knew the notes were patently worthless.
168
  As noted 
above, proving that a bond is worthless imposes a heavy, and perhaps 
impossible, burden on a plaintiff.
169
  Here, the investors who pur-
chased the American Business notes may have been able to recoup 
 
 162 Id. at 754. 
 163 Id. at 755–56.  It is interesting that the Third Circuit analyzed the T.J. Raney & 
Sons legal unmarketability standard despite promulgating a blanket rejection of the 
fraud-created-the-market theory.  This inevitably invites the question of whether, had 
the fraud been more egregious or fit squarely into one of the unmarketability varia-
tions, the Court would have decided the case differently. 
 164 Malack, 617 F.3d at 755–56.  
 165  Id. at 756.  But see supra Part II.D. 
 166 Malack, 617 F.3d at 755 n.10. 
 167 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 168 Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 169 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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some of their principal after American Business went bankrupt.  The 
investors could have also been paid interest on the notes up until 
bankruptcy.  Either scenario would show that the notes were not pa-
tently worthless, thereby making an economic unmarketability argu-
ment unviable. 
The Third Circuit might have presumed reliance under factual 
unmarketability if Malack could have shown that, absent the fraud, a 
regulatory entity would not have allowed the security to come onto 
the market at its actual price and interest rate.  In one sense, this is a 
fairly easy standard to satisfy because most material misrepresenta-
tions or omissions will affect offering price.  On the other hand, the 
standard is flawed for the same reasons set forth in the opinion—the 
SEC does not conduct merit review and the parties issuing the securi-
ty are self-interested.  Because there is no agency or entity passing on 
the adequacy of disclosure information, the court cannot presume 
reliance. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE FRAUD-CREATED-THE-MARKET THEORY 
The Malack decision widened the circuit split and should 
prompt calls for the Supreme Court to address the validity of the 
fraud-created-the-market theory.  Without guidance from the Su-
preme Court, lower courts dealing with the issue face the difficult 
task of stemming frivolous litigation while maintaining effective ave-
nues for relief where such relief would otherwise prove impossible.  
While the Third Circuit decided Malack correctly, the court went too 
far in closing off all possibilities of presuming reliance under the 
fraud-created-the-market theory. 
The Exchange Act’s broad goal of promoting fair markets can-
not be achieved by ensuring full disclosure alone.
170
  While full and 
fair disclosure is undoubtedly a central tenet of the Exchange Act, it 
should be considered one means of attaining fair and honest mar-
kets.
171
  The Supreme Court has espoused the view that securities leg-
islation should be construed “not technically and restrictively, but 
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.”
172
  To that end, where a 
fraudulent scheme is so pervasive and insidious that it renders a secu-
rity completely unmarketable, individuals should not have to prove 
 
 170 See Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)) (“The Supreme Court has held that the acts 
were designed ‘to protect investors against fraud and . . . to promote ethical stand-
ards of honesty and fair dealing.’”). 
 171 Shores, 647 F.2d at 470. 
 172 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
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that they meticulously analyzed every detail of a prospectus to satisfy 
the reliance requirement.
173
  Class certification should be attainable 
by a less onerous standard.  Although the fraud-created-the-market 
theory is an imperfect doctrine and requires some flexibility, the the-
ory provides a plaintiff class with such a standard.  In order for it to 
be workable, however, the Court must clarify the theory in a way that 
limits frivolous litigation. 
At the core of the fraud-created-the-market controversy is that 
almost every court analyzing the theory has treated it as an extension 
of the fraud-on-the-market theory.
174
  This reasoning is problematic 
because the economic justifications of the fraud-on-the-market theory 
are inapplicable to the primary market.
175
  In an actively-traded secu-
rities market, an investor can rely on the market to display all availa-
ble information.
176
  But that market has yet to develop for newly-
issued securities like the American Business notes, and the Malack 
court was correct in pointing out the differences between the two.
177
  
If the fraud-created-the-market theory is to survive, then, the Court 
must first carefully distinguish between the two theories.  The fraud-
created-the-market theory should not be considered an extension of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory because the latter is supported by a 
rationale that is ill-suited for the primary market.  The former can 
and should survive in some form, but only if the two theories remain 
distinct. 
The Supreme Court must also revise and condense the econom-
ic, factual, and legal unmarketability variations.  The circuit courts 
have had difficulty defining unmarketability and, consequently, they 
have defined and applied the three variations haphazardly.
178
  Setting 
forth a unified standard will provide investors, issuers, and courts with 
the necessary clarity for effective and efficient litigation.  Though this 
is a better alternative than rejecting the theory completely, the Court 
will have to articulate one single standard. 
Economic unmarketability is problematic because of the difficul-
ties associated with determining whether a security is worthless.
179
  As 
 
 173 See Peter J. Dennin, Note, Which Came First, the Fraud or the Market: Is the Fraud-
Created-the-Market Theory Valid under Rule 10b-5?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2611, 2648 
(2001). 
 174 See supra Part II.C. 
 175 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 176 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 751 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 178 See supra Part II.C.1–3. 
 179 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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Judge Tjoflat pointed out in Ross v. South Bank, N.A., nearly all bonds 
have some worth.
180
  Moreover, factual unmarketability relies on the 
existence of an entity conducting merit review that does not exist.
181
  
The SEC does not have the capability to verify the accuracy of the of-
fering disclosures for each security being issued, nor is it designed to 
do so.
182
  It is instead the responsibility of the individual investor to 
determine whether the investment is sound given the information 
provided.
183
 
Legal unmarketability offers the best starting point for develop-
ing a clear and concise standard that can close the circuit split.  It is a 
narrow standard that allows an investor to rely only on the fact that a 
security was issued legally; the investor can assume that the issuing 
entities will not act contrary to any state or federal law.
184
  Relying on 
the issuing entities, as opposed to a regulator such as the SEC, allevi-
ates the merit-regulation problem associated with factual unmarketa-
bility. 
One problem inherent in a legal unmarketability standard is that 
investors are in effect relying on self-interested corporate entities.
185
  
As such, issuers are not vouching for the lawfulness of the security; 
they merely want to get the security to the market for monetary gain.  
Critics thus argue that relying on entities involved in an issuance runs 
contrary to common sense.
186
  Although this criticism is logical, ac-
cepting it is to implicitly condone deceitful practices that are con-
ducted to profit from unsuspecting and often underequipped inves-
tors.  Thus, while relying on self-interested actors might require a 
stretch of logic, it allows the promotion of honest and fair markets to 
remain the central focus of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.  Given 
the Court’s flexibility in interpreting the securities laws to reach Con-
gress’s goal,  plaintiffs should be able to rely on a security’s legality.  
Moreover, the legal unmarketability standard is a high burden to 
meet—it requires the plaintiff to prove that the issue was marketed 
illegally, not merely that it was overpriced.
187
  Thus, plaintiffs will nec-
essarily use the presumption in limited circumstances, and this will 
 
 180 Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 736 (11th Cir. 1989) (Tjoflat, J., con-
curring). 
 181 See id. at 735–36. 
 182 See Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 183 See Herzog, supra note 9, at 390. 
 184 For a discussion of legal marketability, see supra Part II.C.1. 
 185 Ross, 885 F.2d at 739–41 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). 
 186 See, e.g.,  Malack v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743, 749–50 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 187 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
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hardly lead to the investor’s’ insurance that courts have been loath to 
create. 
The scienter requirement built into Rule 10b-5 actions provides 
an additional protection against creating a form of investor’s’ insur-
ance.
188
  Here, the Court can require that a plaintiff seeking the bene-
fit of the fraud-created-the-market theory must show that the defend-
ant issuer knew that it lacked the legal authority to offer the security 
but did so anyway.  If the plaintiff cannot show an intentional breach 
of state or federal law, or the issuer can show that it acted innocently, 
the plaintiff cannot avail herself of the presumption and must prove 
direct reliance instead. 
The Court should also make clear an additional limitation.  Like 
in the two presumptions of reliance that have preceded the fraud-
created-the-market theory,
189
 a defendant should have the opportuni-
ty to rebut the presumption.  A defendant could accomplish this by 
showing that the security was not issued illegally or by showing that 
the purchaser knew of the illegality but purchased the security any-
way.  Such a measure would act to limit frivolous litigation, preserve 
the goals of securities laws, and avoid creating a form of investor’s’ 
insurance. 
Thus, the Court might set forth this standard: A plaintiff is enti-
tled to the fraud-created-the-market presumption if she proves that: 
(1) the defendant conspired to bring securities to the market intend-
ing to defraud purchasers when the defendant knew that the securi-
ties were not issued according to state or federal law; (2) the plaintiff 
reasonably relied on the security’s availability in the market as an in-
dication that the security was issued legally; and (3) as a result of the 
scheme to defraud, the plaintiff suffered a loss. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fraud-created-the-market theory is a contentious tool for 
private Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions.  The theory allows 
plaintiffs to presume reliance in the primary market and thus allows 
for class certification where it would be unattainable otherwise.  The 
courts of appeals that have addressed the issue have struggled to fit 
the theory within Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.
190
  
 
 188 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976).  Lower courts have 
held that recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement in a 10b-5 ac-
tion.  See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961–62 (5th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc). 
 189 See supra notes 40, 57 and accompanying text. 
 190 See supra Part II.C. 
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With the Malack decision, the Third Circuit joined the circuit split 
with a decisive rejection of the theory.
191
  Malack should prompt the 
Supreme Court to resolve the issue.  A resolution is even more im-
portant during a time of unprecedented market change and regula-
tory upheaval. 
Abrogating the fraud-created-the-market theory goes too far.  
The theory can be a valid mechanism for providing effective relief 
from egregious cases of securities fraud.  This can only be accom-
plished, however, by distinguishing the theory from the presumptions 
of reliance that have preceded it and by unifying the variations of 
unmarketability that have emerged in the lower courts.  Further, the 
Court must carefully articulate the limitations built into the presump-
tion because such limitations will prevent the flood of frivolous litiga-
tion that could accompany a relaxation of the traditional require-
ment of direct reliance and will avoid rewarding investors for careless 
behavior. 
Legal unmarketability, first articulated by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for Tenth Circuit, offers the Supreme Court the best starting 
point for setting forth a workable standard.  Investors should be able 
to rely on issuers to market securities that are legal, and issuers 
should be held liable for knowingly issuing securities that breach 
governmental regulations.  It is here that the Court can achieve the 
critical balance of providing needed investor relief while upholding 
the goals of the securities laws. 
 
 
 191 See supra Part III. 
